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Possibilities for Modifying the System of Proportional  
Representation Aimed at Stabilising the Executive in the ČR 
Modelling the Results of the 1996 and 1998 Elections to the Chamber of Deputies* 
TOMÁŠ LEBEDA** 
Faculty of the Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague 
Abstract: Due to the longstanding situation in which the Czech Republic has ex-
perienced a series of unstable minority governments, serious debate has arisen over 
the need for changes to be introduced into the electoral system. This paper attempts 
to find a suitable alternative of the representational system, one capable of ushering 
in a period of government stability, by modelling the results of the elections held in 
1996 and 1998. The aim is to determine which type of proportional electoral system 
could transform the party system in such a manner so as to render it capable of set-
ting up a “monochromatic” or two-party majority coalition government. The method 
of modelling the election results is rooted in an exact calculation of specific election 
results by applying particular mathematical formulas to examples of various sizes of 
electoral constituencies. This paper reaches three possible solutions, one of which 
appears to be exceptionally effective. A number of options have been worked out in 
the paper whereby on the basis of the implementation of the proposed electoral sys-
tem, the system of political parties in the Czech Republic could be reconstructed. A 
description and brief evaluation of the proposal for changing the electoral system 
made by the two largest political parties in January 2000, which is also grounded in 
making modifications to the representational system, is adjoined to the overall trea-
tise as an actual addendum. 
Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol. 8 (No. 1: 49-67) 
It is now the third year since the regular parliamentary elections were held in the spring of 
1996 and the Czech Republic still lacks a stable majority government. The elections is-
sued in a two-year period of instability in the executive, during which time two minority 
governments alternated in power. The unorthodox steps leading up to the emergence of 
the second, Tošovský government, including the manner in which the legislative term 
was shortened, and the ensuing call for early elections are worth noting. The example of 
the two subsequent minority governments demonstrates vividly the number of problems 
tied to the instability of the executive in the young Czech democracy. Even the elections 
of 1998 failed to solve the situation and bring about a majority government. Though at 
first glance the results seemed promising, they were unable to ensure the establishment of 
a stable executive for the next four-year period. The outcome instead led to another unor-
thodox move – the signing of an “opposition agreement” and the consequent emergence 
of the third minority government in a row. 
                                                     
*) This paper stems from two more detailed papers published in Czech: “Vládní stabilita v České 
republice a volební systém poměrného zastoupení” [Lebeda 1998], and “Vládní stabilita v České 
republice a volební systém poměrného zastoupení II” [Lebeda 1999a]. 
**) Direct of all correspondence to Tomáš Lebeda, Karla Čapka 1, 360 01 Karlovy Vary, e-mail 
lebeda.tom@seznam.cz 
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In the midst of such a situation, serious discussion emerged over the possible need 
for changes to be introduced into the electoral system, and even for an overall revision of 
the constitution. The two largest parties, ČSSD and ODS, set up a commission to look 
into possible changes that could be introduced into the electoral system, the resulting 
provisions being intended to lead above all to ensuring the stabilisation of the executive 
branch of power. The ideal situation would be one in which following the elections no 
difficulties would be posed in setting up a homogeneous and efficient government, one 
which would command majority support in the lower chamber of Parliament and main-
tain strong, long-term perspectives for its continuing ability to function. The most fre-
quent, though perhaps only the most vocal, opinion on this situation voiced by critics of 
the current electoral system calls for the transformation of the present proportional elec-
toral system into a majority system. There are, however, many other alternatives. This 
paper aims at investigating other possible solutions that could remove the inadequacies of 
the current system while maintaining the principle of proportional representation. Specifi-
cally, I will attempt to deal with the question as to whether the existing principle of pro-
portion applied to elections into the lower chamber of Parliament could be modified in 
such a way as to guarantee its ability to ensure a long-term environment conducive to the 
production of a stable executive. If in conclusion we reach a positive answer to this ques-
tion, this answer will in fact be offering us one of the few possibilities, if not the only 
one, by which the existing situation could be treated without interfering with the constitu-
tion.1 
The Present Electoral System and its Influence on the Party System in the Czech Republic 
The existing system of elections into the lower chamber of Parliament in the Czech Re-
public is founded on the principle of proportional representation. The voter has one vote, 
which is cast on the regional candidate list of the chosen party ballot. This is a “closed” 
candidate list, but the voter is able to change the order of the candidates through four 
preferential votes. The distribution of parliamentary mandates takes place through two 
scrutinies, in which participate only those parties for which the election results on a state-
wide level exceed the 5% threshold, or quorum, of valid votes (which is higher for coali-
tions at 7% for a two-party coalition, 9% for a three-party coalition, and 11% for a multi-
party coalition). In the first scrutiny, the mandates are distributed on the level of the elec-
toral districts with the use of the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula.2 The electoral districts are 
divided according to the old, territorial break-up of administrative units, i.e. seven regions 
and the capital city of Prague, which was in effect up until the beginning of the year 2000. 
The regions do not have a permanently allotted number of mandates, as these are distrib-
                                                     
1) The requirement of the proportional principle in elections to the Chamber of Deputies is stated 
in the Constitution of the Czech Republic, article 18, item 2. 
2) The number of mandates can be determined from the number of votes in various ways with the 
use of mathematical election formulas. One of these is the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula. It belongs 
among those methods known as the methods of electoral quotients. These formulas work with an 
overall number of cast votes (V) and the number of mandates to be distributed (M) in order to 
determine from this the number of votes cast per mandate. The result is the electoral quotient (Q). 
The division of mandates in practice appears as such, that the party receives that number of man-
dates corresponding to the number of times the electoral quotient can be divided by the number of 
votes that the party gained. A model of the quotient of the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula appears as 
Q = V/(M + 1) [see Grofman and Lijphart 1986: 112-123, Filip 1992]. 
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uted according to election participation on the basis of the republic mandate quota, which 
is worked out through use of the Hare formula.3 On average, 25 mandates fall to one re-
gion, while in both of the last elections, in 1996 and 1998, the smallest – the Jihočeský 
region – obtained 14 mandates, and the largest – the Jihomoravský region – obtained 41. 
The party votes remaining from the first scrutiny are carried over into the second scrutiny, 
which encompasses the territory of the entire country. At that point the remaining votes 
from the regions are counted up for the individual parties, and the mandates are then fur-
ther distributed, again through the use of the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula. The number 
of mandates allocated corresponds to the number that could not be distributed during the 
first scrutiny on the regional level. If even after the first calculation of the second scrutiny 
not all the mandates in the chamber (200) have been distributed, the remaining mandates 
are allocated in a second calculation to those parties demonstrating the largest remainder. 
In the second scrutiny, mandates are allocated according to the candidate lists that the 
parties compose after the first scrutiny has been completed, thus at the time when the 
regional results are already known. 
This is how we could briefly characterise the main points of the existing electoral 
system. The manner in which it is conceived, using the 5% threshold, serves to block 
smaller parties from ever gaining entry into Parliament. However, this system does ensure 
those parties that manage to receive the minimum 5% of the national vote required to gain 
parliamentary representation a relatively large degree of proportionality. The 5% thresh-
old ought to fulfil the function of a stabiliser, to prevent the powers in Parliament from 
splintering, and in this way to facilitate setting up government coalitions. As it works at 
present, however, it only preserves the established situation. Given this fact it cannot be 
considered as an element conducive to the consolidation of parliamentary power. 
I see the causes behind the impossibility of setting up a majority government coali-
tion as being based in two facts. First, within the Chamber of Deputies there are a few 
extremist parties with no, or very limited, coalition potential. The extremists considerably 
narrow the manoeuvring space of the democratic parties for forming majority coalitions. 
Second, the political spectrum is quite polarised even among the democratic parties, 
which again only complicates coalition negotiations. The Czech Republic is, in my opin-
ion, a considerably homogeneous society. There is practically only one fundamental so-
cial fission that can be found in the country. However, there are at least four relevant 
democratic political parties. The existence of a greater number of parties struggling to 
win the support of similarly oriented voters (a phenomenon especially true on the right) 
leads to a situation of constant attacks and assaults being levelled among these parties 
themselves. This type of conflict is usually stronger than the natural rivalry existing be-
tween parties situated at opposite poles of the political spectrum, which in this case would 
involve the left. This kind of mutual antagonism peaked after the early elections of 1998, 
when the two right-wing parties and the one middle-right party were unable to reach a 
coalition agreement even though between them they held a majority of 102 seats in the 
chamber of 200 seats. 
The solution to both problems mentioned above could be to strengthen the majority 
effect of the electoral system. The appropriate variant of a proportional system with a 
                                                     
3) The Hare formula is an original electoral quotient formula, and also the most simple one. The 
model of the formula is Q = V/M. 
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majority effect could render it possible to significantly suppress the influence of extremist 
political parties. Moreover, the party system would then be able to reform itself to take on 
a more efficient shape. The principle of proportional representation is generally quite 
variable, as it accommodates particular conditions and requirements. This variability 
stems from several changeable parameters inherent to it, the forces of which can, in cer-
tain combinations, mutually intensify, subdue, overlap, or remain entirely independent of 
each another. Of particular concern here is the size of the electoral constituency, the 
mathematical formula used to translate the percentage of votes cast into seats, the exis-
tence of a quorum and its level, and finally the number of scrutinies used, which to a large 
degree is connected with the type of mathematical formula employed. Of course, these 
are not the only factors, but in the case of the Czech Republic they are the most material 
ones. In this article I will attempt to find the form of proportional system that would usher 
in a stable executive by means of modelling the election results. Specifically, I will model 
the results from the 1996 and 1998 elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parlia-
ment of the Czech Republic. 
At the outset it is first necessary to define precisely what is intended by the expres-
sion “modelling the election results”. Simply put, it involves the exact calculation of the 
results of specific elections by using the various possible methods that can be applied in a 
proportional electoral system. In order to model the results it is necessary to make use of 
various mathematical formulas that are applied to certain possible size variants of elec-
toral constituencies. In this way I have calculated the results of the 1996 and 19984 elec-
tions to the Chamber of Deputies, in each case using the 66 possible methods as exactly 
as if I were genuinely calculating the election results. The model calculations were car-
ried out gradually on four different size variants of electoral constituencies, including 
calculations carried out within the framework of a single constituency composed of the 
entire territory of the Republic, and calculations carried out in the framework of the eight 
former administrative (electoral) districts representing electoral constituencies up until the 
end of 1999. Other variants of constituencies used here include the 14 Supreme Territo-
rial Administrative Units (VÚSC) which took over from the former administrative dis-
tricts in the year 2000, and 38 small electoral constituencies that were created specifically 
for the task set forth in this article. These small constituencies were formed by dividing 
up individual districts in order to make them as equal as possible in size. Nine mathe-
matical formulas were used to translate the percentage of votes cast into seats, and in the 
case of three formulas involving multiple scrutinies, additional possible formulas were 
applied in the second scrutiny. This work produced a rich amount of material useful for 
reaching more general conclusions. 
For the purpose of this article I will introduce only those calculations carried out 
with the help of three formulas: the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula, which is currently used 
for elections into the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic, the d’Hondt system, 
and the Imperiali system of highest averages. In the results of the formulas I have tested 
the latter two demonstrate the strongest potential for providing the executive with stabil-
ity.5 
                                                     
4) Prior to the publication of this article models for the 1992 elections into the Czech National 
Council were also prepared, and confirmed the majority of trends and phenomena presented here. 
5) The Hagenbach-Bischoff formula has already been described above. The d’Hondt System – 
divides in the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, … and the Imperiali System – divides in the sequence of whole 
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Modelling the 1996 Election Results into the Chamber of Deputies 
After the elections in 1996, six political parties were voted into the Chamber of Deputies. 
The other ten running parties were unable to receive enough support to pass over the 5% 
threshold. From left to right on the political spectrum the successful parliamentary parties 
were: the Communist Party (KSČM) with 22 mandates, the Czech Social Democratic 
Party (ČSSD) with 61 mandates, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s 
Party (KDU-ČSL) with 18 mandates, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which won the 
elections with 68 mandates, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the smallest party, 
with 13 mandates, and the Assembly for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslova-
kia (SPR-RSČ) with 18 mandates. Extremist parties, left-wing Communists, and the ex-
treme right-wing Republicans, none of which could be considered for inclusion in any 
coalition, won 40 seats together, which constitutes a full 20% of all seats. Those democ-
ratic parties wishing to form a majority coalition government would have needed to find 
support from a minimum of 101 out of the 160 democratic representatives. In this situa-
tion the only variant available for forming a majority coalition was the “grand coalition” 
of ODS and ČSSD. But this coalition was unacceptable for many reasons and would have 
been, in my opinion, an exceptionally bad move as parliamentary opposition would have 
then be composed primarily of extremist party representatives (40 deputies from extrem-
ist parties and only 31 deputies from the democratic parties of KDU-ČSL and ODA). 
Such a situation could in turn have had a future influence on strengthening the position of 
the extremists. In the end, the minority, centre-right government of Prime Minister 
Václav Klaus was formed, composed of ODS, KDU-ČSL and ODA, with a narrow mi-
nority of 99 deputies. 
The following tables represent only a sample of the most important election calcu-
lations modelled for the task of this article. In particular, I will focus on those modelled 
calculations that demonstrate potential for ensuring the establishment of a majority gov-
ernment coalition. Most of the comments on the issue of electoral constituencies, such as 
individual calculations, forming a majority etc., will be left until the 1998 elections are 
modelled. The modelled calculations for the 1996 elections are presented here only 
briefly, and I have completely omitted the modelled calculations carried out within the 
framework of the previously mentioned single electoral constituency, as well as those for 
the eight electoral constituencies of the former, now non-existent, districts. 
Table 1. 1996 elections: 14 electoral districts, “Supreme Territorial Administrative Units” 
(VÚSC) 
     KDU- SPR- 
System/Formula strength ratio ODS ČSSD KSČM ČSL RSČ ODA 
Hagenbach-Bischoff formula 98:61:41 69 61 23 17 18 12 
d’Hondt system 98:65:37 72 65 20 15 17 11 
Imperiali system 103:73:24 87 73 17 12 7 4 
 
1996 regular results 99:61:40 68 61 22 18 18 13 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
numbers beginning with two: 2, 3, 4, 5, …. The mentioned electoral systems are described in [Li-
jphart 1986, Filip 1992]. 
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The electoral constituencies in the modelled calculations above represent the newly valid 
electoral districts now in use. For the purpose of clarity, and so as not to be confused with 
the eight older districts, we will refer to the new districts by the acronym of their full title 
– VÚSC. The second column in the Table presents the ratio of strength in the Chamber of 
Deputies (e.g. 99:61:40). The first number in the ratio indicates the number of coalition-
government seats in Parliament, the second number indicates the seats held by opposition 
democratic parties possessing coalition potential, and the third number indicates the num-
ber of seats held by opposition, extremist parties with no coalition potential. In actual 
terms the ratio expresses the following proportional composition: “OSD + KDU-ČSL + 
ODA : ČSSD : KSČM + SPR-RSČ. 
The calculation on the second-last row involves the Imperiali system, which is the 
only one that here enabled the formation of a majority government. A majority of 103 
deputies is by no means great, but the strength of the extremist parties has been almost 
halved (from the original 40 down to 24). The application of the Imperiali system to 
VÚSC represents, in my opinion, one alternative for changing the electoral system. But I 
will say more about this variant when we reach the modelling of the 1998 elections. 
Table 2. 1996 elections, 38 electoral constituencies 
     KDU- SPR- 
System/Formula strength ratio ODS ČSSD KSČM ČSL RSČ ODA 
Hagenbach-Bischoff formula 101:64:41 69 61 20 17 15 12 
d’Hondt system 100:77:23 89 77 17 10 6 1 
Imperiali system 112:85:3 106 85 3 6 0 0 
 
1996 regular results 99:61:40 68 61 22 18 18 13 
 
The table above presents the use of small, on average five-mandate electoral constituen-
cies. A noticeable majority effect appeared again under the Imperiali system. Not only 
would the coalition acquire a majority of 112 mandates, but the majority government 
could be formed by ODS alone with 106 deputies. The strength of the extremists has in 
this case been paralysed, with the presence of only three Communist deputies. This result 
is balanced with the serious losses felt by the two smallest democratic parties, KDU-ČSL 
(6 mandates) and ODA (no mandates). However, there still exists a very real possibility 
whereby these parties could gain representation in Parliament, which will be discussed 
later in connection with the modelling of the 1998 elections, and again finally in the con-
clusions. The Imperiali system as applied to small electoral constituencies thus offers 
another serious alternative that could provide the Czech Republic with an environment 
conducive to stable majority governments. The d’Hondt system, which is usually consid-
ered to benefit large parties, did not manage to provide the sought after majority govern-
ment in the modelling of the 1996 elections in any of the variants for electoral 
constituencies. 
Modelling the Results of the 1998 Elections 
In the autumn of 1997, the minority coalition government of Václav Klaus collapsed un-
der interesting circumstances: it occurred not due to external, opposition pressure, but 
rather due to pressure from within the coalition itself. There followed another minority 
government formed by Josef Tošovský, with the intention of carrying the country through 
to the early elections in the spring. These elections partially altered the appearance of the 
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Chamber of Deputies, in which at that time only five parties maintained their representa-
tion. The Communist Party (KSČM) received 24 mandates, while the Social Democrats 
(ČSSD) won the elections and received 74 mandates. The People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) 
won 20 mandates and the Civic Democrats (ODS) won 63. A new party, the right-wing 
Freedom Union (US) which emerged out of the split-up of ODS after the collapse of its 
coalition government in autumn 1997, appeared in the chamber with 19 deputies. This 
party de facto filled in the position in the chamber of ODA, which did not run in these 
elections. Unlike ODA, which lay to the right of ODS on the political spectrum, US even-
tually situated itself slightly more toward the political centre, after its later co-operation 
with the centrist KDU-ČSL in the Senate elections. In addition to seven other parties, the 
Republicans (SPR-RSČ) were unable to reach the threshold in these elections. 
ČSSD won the elections but still had no hope of setting up a majority government. 
The anticipated coalition with the centrist (or centre-right) KDU-ČSL was not enough to 
provide the required number of deputies. The Freedom Union, which through its partici-
pation in the coalition could have ensured a majority government, refused to co-operate 
with the left-wing ČSSD, for reasons that are on the whole understandable. The dubious 
coalition of Communists and Social Democrats would also not have been able to attain 
majority support. The coalition of Communists, Social Democrats and the People’s Party 
was ruled out beforehand by the People’s Party itself. Conversely, a majority could have 
been attained through the centre-right coalition of ODS, KDU-ČSL, and US with 102 
deputies. This was the only possible majority coalition, and the most unified in terms of 
programme and ideology, but attempts at its formation were not successful. This was due 
to an inability to reach a consensus among the parties involved, the source of the conflict 
of course stemming from the collapse of the similarly formed Klaus government, and 
further exacerbated over the course of the pre-election campaign by personal conflicts 
between the leading representatives of the parties. 
Below I will attempt to present in a detailed manner the modelled calculations of 
the 1998 elections. The search for possible variants of majority coalitions in this case will 
not be as easy as in the previous, 1996 elections. Here it is necessary to use three strength 
ratios corresponding to the three possible alternatives for government coalitions. As I 
have pointed out, leaving aside the “grand coalition”, the first variant appears as the cen-
tre-right coalition (ODS, US, KDU-ČSL) with 102 deputies, and the strength ratio for this 
coalition will also be presented first. The second variant to be presented involves co-
operation between the victorious ČSSD and the third largest party – the Communists. 
This is a dubious arrangement and I would have strong reservations against any such co-
operation, but prior to the elections voices from the ranks of ČSSD emerged in favour of 
maintaining this option, and for this reason it cannot be overlooked. Co-operation be-
tween ČSSD and KSČM can only be expressed here in a strength ratio of two positions: 
the number of mandates of the governing parties to the number of mandates of the oppo-
sition parties. The third variant, which could be considered as the optimal one, is that of 
co-operation between ČSSD and KDU-ČSL. This type of variant was declared as gener-
ally acceptable even prior to the elections, but in the end it did not succeed because the 
People’s Party was unwilling to enter into any minority government dependent on the 
tacit support of the Communists. 
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14 Electoral Constituencies – VÚSC 
Table 3 offers a comparison of the division of mandates among the individual electoral 
constituencies of VÚSC. The calculation was carried out on the basis of the participation 
of the electorate and the application of the currently valid Hare formula and the method of 
greatest remainders. 
Table 3. Fourteen electoral constituencies – VÚSC – division of mandates among individual 
constituencies 
electoral constituency no. of mandates 1996 no. of mandates 1998 increase/decrease 1998 
Praha 23 24 +1 
Central Bohemia region 22 22 0 
České Budějovice region 12 12 0 
Plzeň region 11 11 0 
Karlovy Vary region 5 5 0 
Ústí nad Labem region 15 15 0 
Liberec region 8 8 0 
Hradec Králové region 11 11 0 
Pardubice region 10 10 0 
Jihlava region 11 11 0 
Brno region 23 22 -1 
Zlín region 12 12 0 
Olomouc region 13 13 0 
Ostrava region 24 24 0 
ratio – smallest/largest 1 : 4.8 1 : 4.8 
percentage of change 14.3 
 
The differences in the number of the allocated mandates between the years 1996 and 
1998 are minimal. Changes occurred in only two of the fourteen constituencies (percent-
age of change – 14.3%) and in neither case did it involve more than a single mandate. The 
ratio between the smallest and largest constituencies in 1996 (1:4.8) remained unchanged 
in 1998. However, this ratio is in no way ideal. Large constituencies produce relatively 
proportional results. But a number of smaller constituencies (especially the Karlovy Vary 
district) are capable of producing results similar to those seen in majority electoral sys-
tems. Even though similar examples of such a situation can be found elsewhere in 
Europe, this type of disproportion could be used as an argument against using VÚSC as 
electoral constituencies. 
Table 4. 1998 elections – 14 electoral constituencies – “Supreme Territorial Administrative 
Units” (VÚSC) – valid administrative divisions as of the year 2000) 
 strength ratio in CD number of mandates 
 possible coalitions → ČSSD ČSSD ODS+US    KDU- 
↓ system/formula  +KSČM +KDU-ČSL +KDU-ČSL ČSSD ODS KSČM ČSL US 
Hagenbach-Bischoff formula 98:102 94:83:23 102:75:23 75 64 23 19 19 
d’Hondt system 101:99 95:83:22 99:79:22 79 66 22 16 17 
Imperiali system 104:96 102:82:16 96:88:16 88 75 16 14 7 
 
1998 regular results 98:102 94:82:24 102:74:24 74 63 24 20 19 
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The first row of the table is of primary interest. As I have said, the Hagenbach-Bischoff 
formula in combination with VÚSC has already become a valid component of the present 
electoral system. However, as is evident in the modelled outcome, it does not bring about 
any serious changes. Differences of practically the same sort can be found in the mod-
elled calculations of the 1996 elections. 
Table 5. Hagenbach-Bischoff formula applied to VÚSC in the 1996 and 1998 elections – 
percentage of mandates allotted in the first scrutiny 
  constituency with   constituency with 
 1996 the lowest percentage 1998 the lowest percentage 
VÚSC 86.5% 40% 90.5% 60% 
 
The outcome in Table 5 is a result of the smaller number of mandates that the Hagen-
bach-Bischoff formula is capable of distributing in the first scrutiny when applied within 
the framework of VÚSC. This fact is logically due to the larger number of electoral con-
stituencies. However, one serious drawback is the fact that in certain constituencies it 
manages in the first scrutiny to distribute only a small percentage of the mandates that the 
constituency has been allotted, a phenomenon typical in this situation for small constitu-
encies. In the table, the Karlovy Vary district is an example of this: in the 1996 elections 
it received only 2 out of 5 mandates, a mere 40%, and in the 1998 elections it received 3 
of 5 mandates, or 60%. The situation in which candidates from a given district receive 
only a small percentage of the mandates that have been allotted to the district is simply 
unacceptable. The Hagenbach-Bischoff formula is generally unsuitable for environments 
made up of small electoral constituencies, especially when the mandates are distributed 
among a larger number of parties. As some VÚSC may also be defined as small constitu-
encies, the formula shows itself to be unsuitable even for the new form of electoral con-
stituencies in the Czech Republic. This finding provides another fundamental argument in 
favour introducing changes into the current electoral law. 
Returning now to Table 4, it is clear that the d’Hondt system did help the strongest 
party, ČSSD, but not to any great extent. This system would produce the only model of a 
minimal majority coalition composed of ČSSD and KSČM, with 101 deputies. The Impe-
riali system is an entirely separate matter, as it is the only method that managed to “stir 
up” the number of mandates of individual parties. This system strengthens the gains of 
the larger parties more considerably. When compared to the actual outcome of the elec-
tions, the change in the mandates of the individual parties appears as follows: ČSSD 
would gain the most with 14 mandates and ODS would also gain 12 mandates, while 
KSČM would lose 8 mandates, KDU-ČSL would lose 6, and US would suffer the largest 
loss of 12 mandates. The question then arises as to why KDU-ČSL, which obtained less 
votes, lost fewer mandates than the larger party KSČM. The explanation is simple, in that 
the behaviour of this formula within the framework of VÚSC more closely resembles that 
of the majority electoral system. One of the traits of such a system is that a smaller party 
with a strong local rooting as a rule gains a larger number of mandates than a similar or 
larger party that has its voters scattered throughout the territory of the state. The situation 
of these two parties to a certain extent resembles this model. KDU-ČSL thus profits from 
its higher support in some regions of Bohemia and Moravia. 
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If we scan the ratio of strength it becomes clear that two variants of majority coali-
tion governments emerge at once. The first is the dubious coalition of ČSSD and KSČM, 
which would receive 104 mandates in the chamber. The second possibility is the coalition 
of ČSSD and KDU-ČSL, which would receive 102 mandates. This calculation clearly 
demonstrates the problematic situation faced by the Czech party system. In order for the 
strength ratio to shift in a relatively unobtrusive way and enable the formation of a major-
ity coalition, a much more considerable shift must occur in the acquisition of mandates 
among the individual parties. It is necessary to employ methods that would bring about a 
great enough gain for the large party in a potential coalition so that it exceeds that which 
is lost by its small coalition partner. One positive aspect is that a decrease in mandates 
can also occur in the case of the extremist KSČM, which is a party with at best only lim-
ited coalition potential. In this way greater space is opened up in general for the formation 
of majority coalitions. A majority of 102 mandates is not large and does not arouse too 
much confidence in the aspects of this system. However, the calculation of the 1996 elec-
tions conceded a majority of 103 mandates even for the then coalition of ODS, KDU-
ČSL and ODA. Given that the positive outcome confirms itself repeatedly I would rank, 
with minor reservations, the combination of the Imperiali system and VÚSC among the 
methods to be considered as an alternative to the current electoral system. It is the only 
formula capable of achieving such an outcome in the framework of VÚSC, or in other 
words, within the newly valid administrative arrangement, and in the search for suitable 
variants for the electoral system, even this fact could play a more significant role. 
38 Electoral Constituencies 
In this section I will work with the small electoral constituencies created for the task set 
forth in this article. The original idea behind the constituencies, which were to have on 
average 5 mandates each, involved the necessity of creating a round number of 40 man-
dates in total. It was possible to divide the Czech Republic into 38 small electoral con-
stituencies under the following specific conditions: (1) The constituencies had to respect 
the borders of the districts so that no district would be a part of two or more electoral 
constituencies and (2) the constituencies had to respect the borders of VÚSC so that no 
constituency would rest on the territory of two or more VÚSC. In other words, constitu-
encies were created by uniting districts within the framework of the VÚSC. It may actu-
ally be an advantage to respect territorial arrangements when organising and subsequently 
summarising elections. 
Table 6. 38 electoral constituencies – sizes of the electoral constituencies 
 no. of constituencies no. of constituencies 
electoral constituency in 1996 in 1998 change in 1998 
constituencies with 3 mandates 2 2 0 
constituencies with 4 mandates 4 5 +1 
constituencies with 5 mandates 18 16 -3; +1 
constituencies with 6 mandates 11 12 -1; +2 
constituencies with 7 mandates 2 2 -1; +1 
constituencies with 8 mandates 1 1 -1; +1 
ratio – smallest/largest 1 : 2.67 1 : 2.67 
percentage of change   15.8 
constituencies with a change in the no. of mandates  6 
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Table 6 presents a comparison of the size of the small electoral constituencies in the elec-
tions of 1996 and 1998. In both cases the number of mandates were allocated to the indi-
vidual constituencies on the basis of electoral participation (or the number of valid votes), 
determined by means of the Hare formula and the method of greatest remainders. Thus 
the same method was used as that by which the mandates are distributed according to the 
currently valid electoral law. The size of the electoral constituencies fluctuates between 
three to eight mandates, the most common being those with five or six mandates. There 
were only two constituencies with three mandates during both election years and they 
were the same ones on both occasions. There was only one constituency with eight man-
dates in both election years, but on each occasion a different one. These extremes are 
clearly exceptions caused by the complications mentioned in connection with respecting 
the district and the VÚSC borders. Of the total 38 electoral constituencies, a change oc-
curred in the number of mandates in only six cases between the years 1996 and 1998. The 
ratio between the smallest and the largest electoral constituency (1:2.67 – in both years) is 
the most favourable in this case, when compared with the regions (1:2.93 – in both years) 
and the VÚSC (1:4.8 – in both years). 
Table 7. 1998 elections – 38 electoral constituencies 
 strength ratio in CD number of mandates 
 possible coalitions → ČSSD ČSSD ODS+US    KDU- 
↓ system/formula  +KSČM +KDU-ČSL +KDU-ČSL ČSSD ODS KSČM ČSL US 
Hagenbach-Bischoff formula 100:100 97:83:20 100:80:20 80 68 20 17 15 
d’Hondt system 111:89 100:79:21 89:90:21 90 74 21 10 5 
Imperiali system 110:90 113:84:3 90:107:3 107 84 3 6 0 
 
1998 regular results 98:102 94:82:24 102:74:24 74 63 24 20 19 
 
Table 7 presents the modelled calculations carried out within the framework of the small 
constituencies. For small constituencies, the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula is simply unac-
ceptable, regardless of any of the results. In the first scrutiny it was able to distribute a 
mere 68.5% of the mandates and in the modelling of the 1996 elections it managed only 
58.5% of the mandates. The remainder had to be carried over into the second scrutiny. 
Furthermore, in the case of this system, extreme situations occurred again, whereby only 
one half of the allotted mandates were distributed within the constituency. 
The d’Hondt system allowed for one majority alternative in the form of a coalition 
between ČSSD and KSČM. The Communists lost the least in comparison to the actual 
results. Conversely the greatest loss was felt by US. A very similar trend was witnessed 
also in the modelling of the 1996 elections. Under these circumstances the d’Hondt sys-
tem is not an acceptable alternative. It is, however, one of the most frequently used elec-
toral formulas in systems of proportional representation around the world. This fact may 
make it much more preferable as opposed to the less known Imperiali system. Moreover, 
there is a way to possibly alter its continuously unsatisfactory outcome: to further reduce 
the size of the electoral constituencies. The modelled calculation was carried out on 38 
small constituencies. The majority of them were allotted five or six mandates. If the num-
ber of electoral constituencies were increased toward 50, the constituencies would receive 
on average four mandates. In such a situation the d’Hondt system would produce entirely 
different results, closer to those seen in a majority system. This statement is demonstrated 
in the fact that with the modelled calculation for the year 1998, the Communists, as the 
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largest of the smaller parties, gained only a quarter of the mandates in the fourth position 
of the order of allocating mandates within the constituencies. The remaining three-
quarters were allocated in the fifth and sixth positions. This means that the Communists 
in a four-mandate constituency gained considerably fewer mandates than in the modelled 
calculation, and the situation was similar in the case of the remaining smaller parties. 
This is not all as simple as it seems. The creation of small electoral constituencies 
is complicated by the understandable necessity (and desirability) of respecting the borders 
of the districts. Moreover, I formed my 38 constituencies under the condition that the 
VUSC borders remain intact. If we were to free ourselves of this condition I believe that 
the number of electoral constituencies could yet be increased, and in this situation the 
d’Hondt system would become acceptable. However, there exist certain borders that 
ought not to be crossed, even if the size of the constituencies were to be reduced, and my 
assumption is that the 38 constituencies already lie on these borders. 
The final but most important calculation carried out on the small constituencies in-
volves the Imperiali system. As with VÚSC, in the case of the small constituencies it is 
the only alternative that offers more than one variant of a majority coalition. However, 
here the overall results are much more radical. The system unambiguously boosted the 
two largest parties. As compared to the actual results, ČSSD gained an additional 33 
mandates, meaning they held an overall majority of 107 mandates. ODS gained an addi-
tional 21 mandates giving them a total of 84. The other parties saw only a decrease, with 
KSČM losing 21 mandates and reaching a total low of 3, KDU-ČSL losing 14 and being 
left with 6, while US lost all 19 of its mandates. The Imperiali system confirmed for the 
second time, as with the modelling of the 1996 elections, that it is capable of producing a 
gain for the victorious political parties significant enough to make them capable of com-
manding majority support in Parliament.6 I consider the reduction in the number of man-
dates gained by KSČM to only three, the same number it acquired in the modelling of the 
1996 elections, to be a positive development. Given the strong local support in certain 
regions for KDU-ČSL, which has already been mentioned, the result for this party was 
higher than for KSČM even though the Communists overall received 2% more of the 
vote. Of particular interest is the comparison of the electoral constituencies in which 
KDU-ČSL and KSČM were successful in both years. It must be remembered that the two 
parties received in both subsequent elections the same number of mandates, KSČM – 
three, and KDU-ČSL – six. The electoral gain of these parties in individual constituencies 
of course never exceeded one mandate. The Communists gained two to three mandates in 
1998 in the same two constituencies as in 1996. KDU-CSL gained all six mandates in 
both election years also in the very same constituencies! 
The Imperiali system in both years guaranteed the victorious political parties an ab-
solute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and this effect was confirmed by both par-
ties. Following the 1996 elections, a majority government was set up by ODS, and after 
the 1998 elections, by ČSSD. This provides a view of a positive alternation of the two 
largest parties. Such an outcome could fully be achieved by the 38 small electoral con-
stituencies we have mentioned, which respect the VÚSC borders. The organisation of the 
elections would in this way remain without any difficulty within the framework of exist-
                                                     
6) In the modelled 1996 elections ODS gained 106 mandates. The combination mentioned here 
thus confirmed itself in “both directions”, in the case of ODS and in the case of ČSSD. For more 
see [Lebeda 1998]. 
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ing administrative divisions. There is no doubt that this would be advantageous to the 
relevant bodies in charge of running the elections, as well as to the political parties them-
selves and their organisational structures. I consider the Imperiali system in combination 
with the small constituencies as another suitable variant for ensuring a stable executive in 
the Czech Republic. 
To sum up, three possible variants have been determined as being capable of lead-
ing to the formation of a more stable and effective government commanding majority 
support in Parliament within the framework of the proportional electoral system. The first 
variant was the Imperiali system as applied to the 14 electoral constituencies correspond-
ing to VÚSC, thus the newly valid criteria. The second possibility appeared with the 
d’Hondt system applied within the framework of 50 small, on average four-mandate elec-
toral constituencies. The third and in my opinion most suitable variant showed itself to be 
the Imperiali system as applied to the 38 small, on average five-mandate constituencies. 
On the basis of an electoral system drawn up according to the third variant, a fundamental 
change in the appearance of the party system would also occur. My assumption is that 
there exist three possible means by which the party system could be reconstructed. 
The first means of reconstructing the party system is clearly evident. The last mod-
elled calculation allocated 95.5% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the two larg-
est parliamentary parties. This means an almost complete realisation of the idea of 
bipartism, or the two-party system. Parties as a rule would command majority support in 
the chamber, and would have more room to implement their programmes with fewer ob-
stacles. 
Alongside clear bipartism, this system opens the possibility of drawing some of the 
smaller parties into participation in the chamber. How is this possible? A proportional 
system with this kind of strong majority effect has one interesting characteristic: it sig-
nificantly motivates parties into pre-election co-operation. At present only a few small 
parties have any motivation to form pre-election coalitions, and only out of concern about 
reaching the threshold and gaining representation in Parliament. However, in certain cir-
cumstances it may be an advantage even for a large party to engage in pre-election co-
operation with a small party and enter the elections together. Even a small percentage 
increase in electoral gains, caused by the votes cast for the small coalition partner, leads 
to a considerable increase in the number of acquired mandates, which can be decisive for 
gaining a majority of seats in the chamber. Situations of this type can be modelled 
through motivational calculations. 
As an example of a motivational calculation I can introduce the theoretical co-
operation of ODS and US in the 1998 elections. I should first point out, however, that the 
motivational calculation is only a technical indicator, which is not intended to, and in fact 
cannot, predict what the genuine common gain of these two parties would be, as it leaves 
out many important factors such as the mutual relationship between the two parties at the 
time of the elections and the psychological impact of such co-operation on the voter. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to artificially create a situation, in which ODS and US would 
enter the elections as a single coalition, and in which we would use the recommended 
Imperiali system as applied to 38 small constituencies. The first row of Table 8 presents 
the modelled calculation of the Imperiali system (as it was depicted in Table 7), and the 
second row shows its motivational calculation. The “actual gain” (that is the difference 
between the results when both parties run separately and the results when they run to-
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gether) shows how much higher the theoretical gain for ODS and US would be as op-
posed to the situation in which each party runs alone. The motivational index shows the 
increase in the number of mandates in percentage points. 
Table 8. 1998 elections – motivational calculation I – the Imperiali system + small electoral 
constituencies 
  ODS  KDU-  actual motivational 
system/formula ČSSD (+US) KSČM ČSL US gain index 
Imperiali system 107 84 3 6 0 
Imperiali – motivational  
calculation ODS + US 92 107 1 0 X 23 +27.4% 
 
By running alone, US would not gain any mandates, and ODS in the same situation 
would gain 84 (see the first row). However, the motivational calculation allocates a total 
of 107 mandates (see the second row) when they run together, a result that would theo-
retically alter the election victory. The remaining parties, with the exception of ČSSD, 
would practically disappear from the chamber altogether. I have already mentioned that 
this calculation cannot be considered as a serious statement of the actual situation were 
these two parties to genuinely run together, but it does suggest something. Generally we 
could say that the percentage increase of a small political party, which alone would not 
gain entry into the chamber, is potentially significant for the large party given the consid-
erable hike in the common gain in mandates. In any case, this form of pre-election coali-
tion is entirely dependent on the willingness of large parties to engage in such co-
operation. Examples borrowed from the international political scene demonstrate that pre-
election party coalitions are usually stronger and more stable than government coalitions 
formed on the basis of election results. This development could even lead to the estab-
lishment of two strong blocks of alliances, which could alternate in power in a manner 
similar to that of two alternating parties. One example of a similar system that works due 
to the double-ballot majority electoral system may be found in the case of France. The 
second variant for reconstructing the Czech party system conforms to this description. 
The third and final possibility presented here for a new form of party system could 
be the two-and-a-half party system. It is possible to assume that after reform initial ten-
dencies would incline most strongly in this direction. My personal assumption, however, 
is that in the long run this trend is not the most likely. It presents a situation in which a 
political entity would wedge itself in between the two largest parties and also be large 
enough to be capable of overcoming the inherent barrier of the electoral system. This kind 
of party, or more probably a coalition of parties, would be present in the chamber in a 
considerably under-represented form, but by spreading its forces in a particular way it 
would be capable of tipping the proverbial balance, and thus become a participant essen-
tial to the formation of majority coalitions dependent on which of the two large parties 
the small one inclines toward. In the circumstances of the Czech Republic, an analogy for 
this could be found in the four-party coalition that emerged out of the Senate elections. 
This variant also has a relevant motivational calculation. 
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Table 9. 1998 elections – motivational calculation II – the Imperiali system + small electoral 
constituencies 
    KDU-ČSL  actual motivational 
system/formula ČSSD ODS KSČM (+US) US gain index 
Imperiali system 107 84 3 6 0 
Imperiali – motivational  
calculation KDU-ČSL + US 99 75 1 25 X 19 +317% 
 
As the table shows, the two small parties could defend themselves against the two-party 
system by entering into a pre-election coalition, the motivational calculation indeed indi-
cates such a situation. The result of 6 mandates for KDU-ČSL and no mandates for US 
would in a joint running of the two parties be transformed into 25 mandates altogether. 
The actual gain would be 19 mandates, displayed in the percentage points of the motiva-
tional index at 316.7%. In this particular case the role of a coalition partner essential to 
the formation of a majority government would genuinely be achieved. Even so I must 
again point out that these numbers are only for orientation, and in reality the situation 
could turn out quite differently. The motivational calculation is not an exact prognosis but 
rather a demonstrative indicator that serves to point out some of the more interesting 
properties of this kind of electoral system. 
In connection with the previously mentioned specific example of co-operation be-
tween KDU-ČSL and US it is necessary to make the following remarks. The situations 
involved in elections to the Senate and elections to the Chamber of Deputies differ in 
many ways. The executive branch of power is established on the basis of elections to the 
lower chamber. For this reason a central political entity formed along the lines outlined 
above would need to be, in terms of its ideology and programme, more unified than is 
true in the case of elections to the upper chamber. It would require the establishment of a 
harmonic and dominant understanding concerning which of the large parties it would be 
willing to form a coalition government with. In the long run, this political entity would 
also need to be willing to enter into a coalition in either direction of the political spec-
trum. The question is whether or not small parties such as KDU-ČSL, US and perhaps 
other small right-wing parties would be capable of this. The distance in terms of ideology 
and programme between the Christian KDU-ČSL, with its strong rural orientation, and 
US, which to a great extent could be characterised as an urban liberal party, leads to some 
doubt in this area. Any conflict within such a political entity would be uncompromisingly 
penalised in the electoral system. Even a small percentage decrease could indicate a dras-
tic loss for the “third” party of a large majority of their mandates in subsequent elections. 
Such a loss could only lead to their long-term and even – given the psychological impact 
of the electoral system – definitive exclusion from the parliamentary scene. However, the 
conditions for forming, as well as the general appearance of pre-election coalitions could 
be addressed through a specific electoral law. In the end it would solely depend on such a 
law as to whether or not in general any of the coalition alternatives mentioned here could 
be achieved. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the modelling of the 1996 and the 1998 elections, the most suitable vari-
ant for changing the electoral system while preserving the principle of proportional repre-
sentation appears to be the combination of the Imperiali system and the 38 small electoral 
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constituencies with an average of roughly five mandates each. The result of its implemen-
tation would likely wipe out the extremist parties with limited coalition potential, and the 
electoral system would considerably strengthen the position of the large parties. Two 
alternatives emerged to enable the continuing survival of small parties in the lower cham-
ber: 
1) Close pre-election co operation with a large party sharing a similar ideology and pro-
gramme, which would be a form of co-operation to some extent advantageous even for 
the large party. Given the strong motivational effect, even a slight percentage contribu-
tion from the small party would mean an increase in the overall number of mandates, 
which could in turn be decisive for establishing a parliamentary majority. 
2) Close pre-election co-operation between small parties, which could lead to the creation 
of a strong and most likely centrist unit, capable of overcoming the barrier of the elec-
toral system. In the lower chamber this political entity would most certainly be under-
represented, but by spreading its forces it could play a decisive role in determining the 
establishment of government coalitions. This variant would require a considerable de-
gree of unity in the programme and outlook of the participating parties in order to en-
sure its long-term survival. 
On the basis of what has been demonstrated here, the implementation of this electoral 
system could evolve in three directions. The first could lead to classic bipartism: two 
main political parties would alternate in power and a monochromatic government would 
be set up commanding majority support in the lower chamber, which would cause neither 
of the two parties any great difficulties. The second could direct the party system toward 
the creation of two blocks of strong alliances, which would alternate in power similarly to 
the first case. The third could lead to the emergence of the two-and-a-half party system, 
which would mean the existence of two parties, as in the first case, with the addition of 
one small, central political entity with the potential to tip the scales in one direction or 
another. This last variant, however, given the unforgiving nature of the electoral system, 
would demand exceptional homogeneity within the central unit, and given the character 
of the potential participants this seems a less likely in the long run. A collision within the 
central, political entity would again lead back to one of the first two variants. 
In conclusion it is necessary to briefly recall some of the more important traits of 
the selected parameters of the electoral system. Small constituencies present the hope of 
enabling much closer contact between the voter and the deputy, both prior to elections 
and even during the legislative term when the mandate is held. Even with the considera-
bly majority-like character of the electoral system, electoral lists would traditionally re-
main within the Czech system. At the same time, parties would be forced to choose a 
much larger number of strong and qualified personalities for the posts of leaders on their 
candidate lists. Preferential votes on small party lists could become an important route 
toward personalising the proportional system. The voter could in this way acquire a 
greater opportunity to influence the personal representation of the party. The character of 
the closed candidate list would in general not change much at all, unlike the situation 
given the present modification. However, it would be necessary to set a percentage of 
preferential votes necessary for moving a candidate into the lead. 
The existence of the quorum could become unnecessary. Its use, preferably at the 
same level it is now set, could nonetheless guarantee even greater stability than that 
which is seen in the majority system. The absence of the quorum could lead to problems 
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with extremism and with the emergence of obscure local and independent candidates. The 
extremists could concentrate most of their attention during the campaign on picking out 
electoral constituencies in which, on the basis of the composition of the electorate, they 
might expect success. Such a strategy of concentrated efforts could, however, be very 
successful for all parties. The 5% threshold forces most parties to campaign and struggle 
over the entire area of the country. The majority effect of small constituencies and the 
Imperiali system would thus be safeguarded and intensified through its combination with 
the use of a quorum. 
Actual Addendum 
In the January 2000 agreement that deepened the “opposition agreement”, ČSSD and 
ODS reached an understanding on the precise form of change to be introduced into the 
electoral system. This agreement emerged out of a compromise. Bear in mind that my 
study rests on an arrangement of 38 electoral constituencies and the Imperiali system for 
allocating mandates. The ODS proposal was quite similar – the Imperiali system and 35-
36 electoral constituencies. The two parties probably concurred on the number of con-
stituencies, but ČSSD proposed the use of the d’Hondt system, which is applied more 
frequently and is less disproportional. The compromise then should be the use of the 
“modified d’Hondt” and 35 electoral constituencies. 
The “modified d’Hondt” is a more or less artificially formed compromise. The 
modification resembles what is referred to in political science as the Sainte-Laguë 
method. Its effects benefit small parties. In order to subdue this characteristic, a modified 
variant was determined, which raises the first divider from a value of 1 to a value of 1.42. 
If we carry out the same change on the d’Hondt system, we reinforce its majority charac-
ter and come closer to the effects of the Imperiali method, which was proposed by ODS. 
Thus more precise than a “modified d’Hondt” would be a “reinforced d’Hondt” system. 
The d’Hondt system altered in this way is of particular significance for the very small 
electoral constituencies of ordinarily five to six mandates. Given the increase of the first 
divider from 1 to 1.42, it very effectively prevents small parties from gaining the first 
mandate. At the same time, it continues to behave in the same way as the classic d’Hondt 
system to the party that gains the first mandate in the electoral constituency. I wrote that 
this variant was a compromise between the d’Hondt and Imperiali systems, but it is nec-
essary to provide a more precise characterisation. In the small constituencies proposed by 
ČSSD and ODS (an average of 5.7 mandates per constituency) the properties of the 
d’Hondt system more closely approach the results of the Imperiali system. Conversely, if 
larger constituencies were to be set up, of roughly 10 mandates more, the results would 
approach or even compare with those of the classic d’Hondt system. Generally, however, 
the dividing line is dependent on other factors as well, particularly on the number of par-
ties among which the mandates are allocated, the mutual proportions of electoral gains 
(votes), the level of the threshold if there is one, and the territorial break up of the support 
of the electorate. 
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Table 10. 1998 elections – the proposal of ČSSD and ODS (the modified d’Hondt method and 
35 electoral constituencies 
    KDU-ČSL  actual motivational 
system/formula ČSSD ODS KSČM (+US) US gain index 
modified d’Hondt system 102 86 4 7 1 
modified d’Hondt system  
– motivational calculation  
KDU-ČSL + US 93 71 2 34 X 26 +325% 
 
If we calculate the possible election results according to the electoral system proposed by 
ČSSD and ODS, the Social Democrats would win with an absolute majority of 102 man-
dates, in front of ODS in second place, which would win 86 seats in the lower chamber. 
The Communists would have four mandates, the People’s Party seven, and US only one. 
Theoretically the Social Democrats could easily set up a monochromatic majority gov-
ernment with strong support in the lower chamber and potential long-term stability. In 
practice, however, there would surely emerge some sort of pre-election co-operation be-
tween the smaller parties, such as that described in the conclusions to the study in this 
article. A motivational calculation based on a joint running of KDU-ČSL and US in the 
1998 elections shows that the election results in this case would turn out entirely differ-
ently. The victorious ČSSD would win 93 mandates and ODS 71, while KDU-ČSL and 
US would together win 34 mandates, and KSČM would have only 2 mandates. I must 
again stress that the motivational calculation here is not a prediction of the mandate gains 
to be had in a joint candidature. Its task is to confirm the high degree of motivation of the 
parties (especially the small ones) toward pre-election co-operation, which could be a 
matter of their survival. At the same time it can tell us a great deal about the feasibility of 
pre-election co-operation between certain parties. 
The variant of the election system proposed by ČSSD and ODS (the modified 
d’Hondt system + 35 electoral constituencies) is so similar in character to the proposal in 
my study (the Imperiali system + 38 electoral constituencies) that the aforementioned 
conclusions also apply. The only difference in contrast to the Imperiali system is that the 
modified d’Hondt system provides more space for a third political party. The party sys-
tem in the Czech Republic could yet on the basis of the selected electoral system recon-
struct itself according to the three possibilities that I have described here. 
Translated by Robin Cassling 
 
TOMÁŠ LEBEDA has completed the Bachelor’s level of study in the field of the humanities at the 
Pedagogical Faculty, UJEP in Ústí nad Labem. He is currently in the Magister level of study in 
the field of political science in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. His 
interests focus on the issues of electoral systems and their influence on the constitution of party 
systems, particularly concentrating on the specifics involved in the system of proportional repre-
sentation. To date he has published his work in the Politologický časopis (1998 and 1999) and in a 
collection of papers stemming from a conference, the Possibilities for Change and Reform of the 
Election System in the Czech Republic (1999). 
References 
Filip, Jan 1992. Základní otázky volebního práva v ČSFR [Fundamental Questions on Electoral 
Law in CSFR]. Brno: Masaryk University, Faculty of Law. 
Tomáš Lebeda: Possibilities for Modifying the System of Proportional Representation 
67 
Grofman, Bernard, Arend Lijphart (eds.) 1986. Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. 
New York: Agathon Press. 
Lebeda, Tomáš 1998. “Vládní stabilita v České republice a volební systém poměrného zastoupení” 
[Government Stability in the Czech Republic and the Electoral System of Proportional Repre-
sentation]. Politologický časopis. 
Lebeda, Tomáš 1999a. “Vládní stabilita v České republice a volební systém poměrného zastoupení 
II.” [Government Stability in the Czech Republic and the Electoral System of Proportional 
Representation II]. Politologický časopis. 
Lijphart, Arend 1986. “Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas.” Pp. 
112-123 in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. by B. Grofman and A. Li-
jphart. New York, Agathon Press. 
